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United States 
oj America 
<tongrcssional1Rc(ord 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THB 9 1st CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 
Vol. 116 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 1970 No. 63 
House of Representatives 
PROPOSED IMPEACHMENT OF AN 
ASSVCIATE SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE 
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a 
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from California (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) 
is recognized for 60 minutes. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise 
in response to the remarks of my distin-
guished leader, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD) las t 
Wednesday evening, when he set for th 
his views of the constitutional power of 
impeachment and stated certain facts 
and opinions which, in his judgment, 
justified his vote for the immediate im-
peachment of Associate Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas. The dialog 
which ensued is reported in the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD of April 15, 1970, 
at pages H3112 through H3127. 
I respectfully disagree with the basic 
premise "that an impeachable offense is 
whatever a majority of the House of Rep-
resentatives considers it to be at a given 
moment in history." 
To accept this view, in my judgment, 
would do grave damage to one of the 
most treasured cornerstones of our liber-
ties, the constitutional principle of an in-
dependent judiciary, free not only from 
pun! c pe8Sions and elT'otioIl..", btlt also 
free from fear of executive or legislative 
disfavor except under already-defined 
rules and precedents. 
The arguments presented last Wednes-
day raise grave constitutional issues, and 
I hope my colleagues will understand 
that I speak not in derrogation of my 
leader's judgment, but to express a dif-
fering view of the law of impeachment 
and the criteria to be applied by the 
House to conduct attributed to a member 
of the Judiciary. I do not speak in de-
fense of Justice Douglas, whom I have 
met but once many years ago. I would 
like to speak, however, for the prinCiple 
of judicial independence and the concept 
that Congress should not challenge a sit-
ting judge except under the clearest 
shOwing of misconduct. 
Also, in view of the fact that the issues 
are those of law and precedent, I think it 
especially incumbent on those of us who 
are lawyers to discuss all aspects of the 
case from the various points of view 
traditional to our profeSsion. 
The first two sentences of the canons 
of ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion impose a speCial duty on lawyers: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain 
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not 
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of. 
the judicial office, but for the maintenance 
of Its supreme Importance. Judges. not being 
wholly free to defend themselves, are pecu-
liarly entitled to receive the supp<Jrt of the 
bar against unjust criticism and clamor. 
In my State of California, the attor-
ney's duty to the courts has been referred 
to as among the foremost of his obliga-
tions. 
'I1he members of. the 1ega.1 profession 
should, above all other members of society, 
be the first to U.phold the dignity Of judicial 
tribunals and 'to protect them against falling 
into that disrepute to whlc:h they would be 
hastened if prooeedings before them were 
oonducted without order or decorum .. . . 
PZatnauer v. Superior Court, 32 oaJ. . App. 463, 
473 (1917). 
Attorneys must observe the prinCiples 
of truth, honesty, and fairness, especially 
in criticism of the courts. In re Hum-
phrey, 174 Cal. 290, 295 (1917l. 
No one would question that our duties 
to the Nation as Members of Congress 
supersede any duty to the courts occa- As we honor the Court's self-imposed 
sioned by our professional background, doctrine of judicial restraint, so we 
but I do think the canons and court de- might likewise honor the principle of 
cisions lend support to the tradition of legislative restraint in considering seri-
this Nation that our courts are not to ous charges against members of a co-
be attacked in the same manner that we equal branch of Government which we 
might criticize political opponents or have wished to keep free from political 
members of the executive branch. tensions and emotions. 
It also seems appropriate for Members The gentleman from Michigan has 
of the House who are also privileged to be properly mentioned the analogy of im-
members of the bar to lay before the peachment to a prosecution, with the 
House such historical facts , interpreta- House acting as prosecutor, the Senate 
tions, and legal argument as may warrant sitting as judge and jury. In this con-
a stricter construction of the term "good nection impeachment itself is a judicial 
behavior" than those urging impeach- proceeding with roots going back in our 
ment have suggested. colonial history long preceding the 
First, I should like to discuss the con- adoption of the Constitution itself. 
cept of an impeachable offense as "what- The Fundamental Orders of Connecti-
ever the majority of the House of Rep- cut, adopted in 1638, first gave the power 
resentatives considers it to be at any to the colonial assembly to remove offi-
given time in history." If this concept cials, and the Charter of Rhode Island 
is accurate, then of course there are no in 1663 used the term "impeachment" 
limitations on what a political majority for this removal process. William Penn's 
might determine to be less than good be- proposed Frame of Government in 1682 
havior. It follows that judges of the Court provided for prosecution of impeach-
could conceivably be removed whenever ment by the general assembly with trial 
the majority of the House and two-thirds of the impeachment by the Pennsylvani'cl. 
of the Senate agreed that a better judge Councdl, or upper house, and this plin-
might fill the position. But this concept ciple was later adopted in various forms 
has no basis, either in our constitutional in the constitutions of a number of the 
history or in actual case precedent. original 13 States. 
The intent of the framers of the Con- There is considerable evidence in the 
stttution was deaTiy to protect JU ges a op on 0 tlIe ConsutUt on ItSelf- m "'a'---
from political disagreement, rather than the Founding Fathers considered im-
to simplify their ease of removal. peachment as analogous to criminal pro-
The Original Colonies had had a long ceedings. The first full draft of a consti-
history of difficulties with the adminis- tution, presented by the Committee of 
tration of justice under the British Five on August 6, 1787, contained a spe-
Crown. The Declaration of Independence cific clause: 
listed as one of its grievances against the The trial of all criminal offences (except 
King : In cases ot Impeachment) shall be In the 
He has made Judges dependent on h is Will state where they shall be committed; and 
alone, 'for the tenure of their offices and the sha.)! be by jury. 
amount and payment of their salaries. 
The signers of the Declaration of In-
dependence were primarily concerned 
about preserving the independence of 
the judiciary from direct or indirect 
pressures, and particularly from the 
pressure of discretionary termination of 
their jobs or diminution of their salaries. 
In the deootes which took place in the 
Constitutional Convention 11 years later, 
this concern was expressed in both of 
the major proposals presented to the 
delegates. The Virginia and New Jersey 
plans both contained language substan-
tively similar to that finally adopted, as 
follows: 
Article m , Section 1 states "The Judges, 
both of the Supreme and Inferior Courts, 
shall hold their offices during good Behavior, 
and shall, at stated times, receIve for their 
Services, a CompensatIon, which shall n ot 
be diminished during their Continuance In 
Office." 
The "good behavior" standard thus 
thus does not stand alone. It must be 
read with reference to the clear intention 
of the farD).ers to protect the independ-
ence of the judiciary against executive 
or legislative action on their compensa-
tion, presumably because of the danger 
of political disagreement. 
If, in order to protect judicial inde-
pendence, Congress is specifically pre-
cluded from terminating or reducing the 
salaries of Judges, it seems clear that 
Congress was not intended to have the 
power to designate "as an impeachable 
offense whatever a majority of the House 
of Representatives considers it to be at a 
given moment." 
If an independent judiciary is to be 
preserved, the House must exercise de-
cent restraint and caution in its defini-
tion of wh at is less than good behavior. 
Under common law, a prosecutor must 
generally prove his case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The presumption that a 
man is innocent until proven guilty by 
persuasive evidence is one which binds 
prosecutors as well as judges. 
No prosecutor, for example, should 
take a case before the court unless he is 
reasonably satisfied of the guilt of the 
accused. Merely "thinking" that the ac-
cused is possibly guilty is not enough. I 
suggest that the hope that further in-
vestigation may develop facts which will 
prove his case should not justify the 
prosecutir's institution of a criminal 
charge, nor should it justify the House 
in filing an impeachment if impeach-
ment is indeed analogous to a criminal 
proceeding. 
There is a far graver question, how-
ever, with the argument that "good be-
havior," or lack of it, is whatever the 
majority of the House wants to make it. 
The term "good behavior." as the 
Founding Fathers considered it, must be 
taken together with the specific provi-
sions limiting cause for impeachment of 
executive branch personnel to treason, 
bribery or other high crimes and mis-
demeanors. The higher standard of good 
behavior required of Judges might well 
be considered as applicable solely to their 
judicial performance and capacity and 
not to their private and nonjudicial con-
duct unless the same is violative of the 
law. Alcoholism, arrogance, nonjudicial 
temperament, and senility of course in-
terfere with judicial performance and 
properly justify impeachment. I can find 
no precedent, however, for impeachment 
of ,a Judge for nonjudicial conduct which 
falls short of violation of law. 
In looking to the nine cases of im-
peachment of Judges spanning 181 years 
of our national history, in every case 
involved, the impeachment was based on 
either improper judicial conduct or non-
judicial conduct which was considered as 
criminal in nature. _ 
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I will yield. 
Mr. GROSS. What is nonjudicial con-
duct of a judge? Conduct that takes 
place when he is not sitting as a judge? 
How can there be nonjudicial conduct? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. In the sense I use 
these terms, judicial conduct would be in 
the conduct of his office on the bench 
and nonjudicial conduct would be his 
private and personal life off the bench 
and utterances unconnected with the 
performance of his judicial duties. That 
is the sense I use it in this discussion. 
Mr. GROSS. What the gentleman is 
saying, then, is if he wants to be a 
Lothario, that is all right as long as it 
does not involve what he is actually do-
ing on the bench. Is that what the gentle-
man is saying? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. If his private or 
personal life should constitute a viola-
tion of criminal or civil law, then, in my 
judgment, it would justify impeachment 
for the failure of good behavior. If, on 
the other hand, his private life might 
be such as to cause blame to fall on him 
on the part of some, but not others, 
then I think that the Congress as its 
peril goes into the question of reaching 
for the first time a definition of what 
is different, rather than good, behavior. 
Let me continue, if I may, and I will 
yield further as I try to bring out this 
point. 
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield on that very point? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Yes. I yield to the 
gentleman. 
Mr. PUCINSKI. I wonder if the gen-
tleman will clarify this hypothesis. Is it 
within the purview of proper conduct for 
a member of the Supreme Court, an 
associate justice, to permit his publisher 
to publish his works in a magazine that 
has a cartoon of the President of the 
United States comparing him to King 
George III of England when this very 
judge may be sitting and every day does 
sit on matters involving the executive 
branch of Government ? Does it come 
within the purview of proper conduct.? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. The question that 
the gentleman asks is, Should a man 
permit his publisher to publish something 
of his, and I would like to state it has 
been mY' privilege as a ' private attorney 
to represent both authors and publish-
ers. The standard form of contract be-
tween an author and a publisher places 
that discretion entirely in the hands of 
the publisher later on with no power on 
the part of the author to say to the 
publisher where it is and where it is not 
reprinted. I will make that point specifi-
cally a little later on, if I may. 
From the brief research I have been 
able to do on these nine cases, and as 
reflected in the Congressional Quarterly 
of April 17, 1970, the charges were as 
follows : 
District Judge John Pickering, 1804 : 
Loose morals, intemperance, and irregu-
lar judicial procedure. 
Associate Supreme Court Justice Sam-
uel Chase, 1805: Partisan, harsh, and un-
fair condUct during trials. 
District Judge James H. Peck, 1831 : 
Imposing an unreasonably harsh penalty 
for contempt of court. 
-District Judge West H. Humhpreys, 
1862 : Supported secession and served as 
a Confederate judge. 
District Judge Cha:!e,s Swayne, 1905: 
Padding expense accourlts, living outside 
his district, misuse of property and of the 
contempt power. 
Associate Court of Commerce Judge 
Robert Archbald, 1913: Improper use of 
influence, and accepting favors from liti-
gants. 
District Judge George W. English, 
1926: Tyranny, oppression, and par-
tiality. 
District Judge Harold Louderback, 
1933 : Favoritism, and conspiracy. 
District Judge Halsted L. Ritter, 1936: 
Judicial improprieties, accepting legal 
fees while on the bench, bringing his 
court into scandal and disrepute, and 
failure to pay his income tax. 
The bulk of these challenges to the 
court were thus on judicial misconduct, 
with scattered instances of nonjudicial 
behavior. In all cases, however, insofar 
as I have been able to thus far determine, 
the nonjudicial behavior involved clear 
violation of criminal or eivil law, and 
not just a "pattern of behavior" that 
others might find less than "good." 
If the House accepts precedent as a 
guide, then, an impeachment of a Justice 
of the Supreme Court based on charges 
which are neither unlawful in nature nor 
connected with the performance of his 
judicial duties would represent a highly 
dubious break with custom and tradition 
at a time when, as the gentleman from 
New York, (Mr. HORTON) stated last 
Wednesday : 
We are living In an era when the Institu-
tions of government and the people who man 
them are undergoing the severest tests in 
hiStory. 
There is merit, I think, in a strict con-
struction of the words "good behavior" 
as including conduct which complies 
with judicial ethics while on the bench 
and with the criminal and civil laws 
while off the bench. Any other construc-
tion of the term would make judges vul-
nerable to any majority group in the 
Congress which held a common view of 
impropriety of conduct which was ad-
mittedly lawful. If lawful conduct can 
nevertheless be deemed an impeachable 
offense by a majority of the House, how 
can any Judge feel free to express opin-
ions on controversial subjects off the 
bench? Is there anything in our history 
to indicate that the framers o{ our Con-
stitution intended to preclude a judge 
from stating political views publicly, 
either orally or in writing? I have been 
unable to find any constitutional history 
to so indicate. 
The gentleman from New Hampshire 
(Mr. WYMAN) suggests that a judge 
should not publicly declare his personal 
views on controversaires likely to come 
before the Court. This is certainly true. 
But it certainly does not preclude a judge 
from voicing personal political views, 
since political issues are not within the 
jurisdiction of the court and thus a 
judge's opinions on political matters 
would generally not be prejudicial to in-
terpretations of the law which his juris-
diction is properly limited. 
To subject a Judge to impeachment for 
controversial political views stated off 
the Bench has a ring of ex post facto un-
less there is some precedent which can 
be found' in our own rather colorful his-
tory as a Nation. 
Against this background of the im-
peachment power, I would now like to 
take up the factual allegations of mis-
conduct made by the gentleman from 
Michigan. 
It should be noted, first of all, that the 
attack on Justice Douglas speciflcally 
does not include attack on his judicial 
opinions, although there is reference to 
criticism of Justice Douglas for "liberal" 
opinions and reference to two specific 
decisions in a 31-year career on the 
Court, both of which are sharply contro-
versial, the stay of execution granted to 
the Rosenbergs, and the dissent relating 
to the allegedly "filthy" film, "I am 
Curious, Yellow." 
It is likewise conceded that it would be 
improper to exclude a man from the 
Court because of his ideology but much 
of the argument against Justice Douglas 
rests on the following references to his 
ideology: 
1. "The article Itself Is not pornographic, 
although It praises the lusty, lurid and ris-
que along with the social protest of left-Wing 
folk-singers ." (Emphasis added.) 
2. "It (Justice Douglas' book) Is a fuzzy 
harangue intended to give historic legitimacy 
to the militant hippie-lli ppie movement and 
to bear testimony that a 71-year old Justice 
of the Supreme Court Is one in spirit with 
them." (Emphasis added .) 
3. "One wonders how this enthusiastic 
traveler inside the Iron Curtai n Is able to 
warn seriously against alleged Washington 
hotel rooms equipped with two-way mirrors 
and microphones." (Emphasis added.) 
4 . "It is more serious than simply a sum-
mation of conventional liberal poppycock," 
as one columnist wrote . (Emphasis added.) 
5. "Douglas described PreSident-elect 
Bosch as an old friend" ... and a few min-
utes later, "Juan Bosch was' about to be 
inaugurated as the new liberal President." 
(Emphasis added.) 
6. "Mr. Justice Douglas m oved Immediately 
Into closer connection with the leftish 'Cen-
ter for the Study of Democratic InStitu-
tions.''' (Emphasis added.) 
7. In 1965 the Santa Barbara Center, which 
Is tax-exempt and ostensibly serves as a 
scholarlif retreat, sponsored. and financed the 
National Conference for New Poll.tlcs which 
was, In effect, the birth of the New Left as 
a political movement." (Emphasis added.) 
8. "Mr. Justice Douglas appears to repre-
sent ... Dr. Robert Hutchins and his intel-
lectual incubators lor the New Left and the 
SDS and others of the same ilk ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
If political philosophy is not a proper 
ground for ilDpeachment, ·then why is 
there need to mention it at all in a dis-
cussion of alleged judicial misconduct 
Which is limited to less than good be-
havior and excludes the question as to 
whether a man is conservative, moderate, 
or liberal? 
I am impelled to note the similarity to 
Mark Antony's eloquence on Caesar's 
death: "For Brutus is an honorable 
man." 
It is in the substance of the allega·tions 
of misconduct, however, where a strict 
construction of What is g'ood behavior 
and what is not for impeachment pur-
poses leads to 'a different conclusion than 
that impeachment is justified. 
Essentially, five charges are made, 
only the flrst of which relaltes to alteged-----
judicial misconduct on the bench. This is 
therefore the most serious charge, since 
admittedly judicial behavior short of 
criminal conduct has historical precedent 
as justifying impeachment. 
THE FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY 
Justice Dougl'llS wrote an article on 
folk singing for the magazine Avant 
Garde at a time when a predecessor 
mag'azine was a defendant in a 19wer 
court case which could be, and was later, 
appealed to the Supreme Oourt. No alle-
gation is made that Justice Douglas knew 
of the lawsuit when he wrote ,the articIe 
in question, or that he knew or de!>lt with 
the defendant publisher, Ginsberg. 
After the article was written and a fee 
of $350 paid to Justice Douglas, the case 
was appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Justice Douglas did not disqualify him-
self, apparently believing that he was not 
in violation of title 28, United States Code 
455, in that he did not have a "substan-
tial interest in the case or had been so 
related to or cOnIlected with any party 
in the case to render it improper, in his 
opinion, to sit on the trial." No allegation 
appears in the recotd that Justice Doug-
las knew of the connection between the 
magazines or thwt the publisher was the 
same from whom he had recei-/ed an au-
t hor 's fee or that a $350 fee paid for a 
mag'azine article is such a connection or 
relationship as to require disqualifica-
tion. Reasonable minds may differ on 
this point, but standing alone it would 
hardly seem to justify the serious con-
sideration of impeachment. The charge 
is made: 
Writing signed articles for nOtoriOUS pub-
1I0000tions of a convicted pornographer Is b6d 
enough. Taking money from them Is worse. 
Declining to disqualify one's self In this case 
Is Inexcusable. 
The third statement might constitute 
misconduct, but any fair judge would re-
quire more factual evidence than that 
thus far presented. If there are other 
facts which would justify that his con-
duct is indeed as. alleged: "insolence by 
which Mr. Justice Douglas has evidently 
decided to sully the high standards of his 
profeSSion, and defy the conveptions and 
convictions of decent Americans," then 
it seems to me that fairness would re-
quire their disclosure at this point in 
ti;ne. 
It might also be noted that the statute 
which requires a judge to disqualify 
himself pointedly leaves this up to the judge's own decision: 
Any justice. or judge of the United States 
should disqualify himself In any case In 
which he . . . is so related to or connected 
with any party or his attorney as to render 
It Improper, in his opinion, for him to sit 
on the trial, appeal or other proceeding 
therein. 
Opinions can change, and in retrospect 
judges sometimes look back and feel they 
should have disqualified themselves in 
cases on which they once elected to sit. 
President Nixon's present nominee to the 
Supreme Court, Circuit Court Judge 
Harry A. Blackmun, has forthrightly and 
candidly admitted just such a change of 
opinion from an earlier decision not to 
disqualify himself. 
I suggest in considering this alleged 
impropriety of Justice Douglas we might 
properly pay heed to Ben Franklin's 
famous words on the flnal day of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787: 
Mr. President, I oonfess that there are sev-
eral parts of this Constitution which I do not 
at present approve, but I am not sure I shall 
never approve t hem. F or, having lived long, 
I have experienced many instances of being 
obliged, by bett er information or fuller con-
Sideration, to change opinions, even on im-
portant subfects, which I once thought right, 
but found to be otherwise. It Is, therefore, 
that, the older I grow the IllDre apt I am to 
doubt my own judgment, and to pay m ore 
respect to the judgment of others ... " 
The second charge against Justice 
Douglas stems from his book, "Points 
of Rebellion." I have read the book since 
the speeches of last Wednesday evening, 
and while again reasonable minds may 
differ in interpretation, I would not nec-
essarily call it any more a distorted dia-
tribe against the Government of the 
United States, than some of the argu-
ments I have heard in this House when 
we challenge some aspect of executive 
branch operation. Nor am I compelled to 
the conclusion that this book is based 
on the thesis that violence may be justi-
fied and perhaps only revolutionary over-
throw of the establishment can save the 
country. 
The language most seriously chal-
lenged that "redress, honored in tradi-
tion, is also revolution," seems more of a 
statement of fact than an exhortation to 
violence, especially when taken in con-
text with later paragraphs expressing the 
thoughts that the revolution could be "in 
the nature of an explosive political re-
generation," and tbe fear that America 
could face "an awful ordeal" if the al-
leged establishment became repressive. 
The third charge relates to the pub-
lishing of excerpts from the book in the 
magazine, Evergreen in juxtaposition 
with other articles or drawings which are 
obscene or, if not, in exceedingly bad 
taste for any association with the dig-
ni ty of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Conceding that such association is in 
bad taste, there is still no evidence stated 
in the record which would indicate Jus-
tice Douglas knew of his publisher's 
choice to permit the excerpted reprint 
that the Justice had expectation or con-
trol over what might be printed with it, 
or even whether the Justice had the right 
under the contract to stop publication. 
From my personal experience as an 
attorney for both authors and publish-
er~, an author does not generally have 
such right under the standard form of 
author-publisher contract. 
The fourth charge alleges that for 
many years Justice Douglas was the paid 
president of the Albert Parvin Founda-
tion, a foundation granted a tax exemp-
tion by the IRS, and that he "may" have 
helped set up the foundation and that he 
"apparently" gave legal advice to its 
creator, Mr. Parvin. Even with the im-
munity of allegations on the floor of the 
House, there is included in the record no 
uneq':livocal alle~ation that Justice Doug-
las did these thmgs in violation of title 
28, United States Code, section 454. It 
appears only that he "may" have done 
so o~ "apparently" did so. Certainly the 
receipt of funds for off-the-job services 
to foundations has only recently been 
C?nsidered as possibly improper for 
~lther Judges or l~rs. To criticize 
Judges for past action at a time when we 
in the House have just begun to consider 
whether to disclose our own honoraria 
has a touch of ex post facto about it. 
are inadequate to justify the extraordi- sum of money for serving on the founda-
nary remedy of impeachment tlnder the tion on which he served, and he com~ 
historic constitutional principles which pared that to the fact that Members of 
I have set forth. the House are finally looking into the 
Preserving judicial independence seems question as to whether or not honoraria 
to me a far more valuable benefit to this that they receive should be subject to 
Nation than the impeachment of one public scrutiny. 
judge on the facts which have thus far Mr. GROSS. If the gentleman will 
been brought to light. If additional facts yield, he was not predicating it on any 
are disclosed, of course, we might want single basis, that or the number of wives 
to reexamine the situation. I contend a Member of the House might have as 
only that the facts alleged last Wednes- compared to a- Justice of the Supreme 
day do not meet the proper criteria of Court. 
law and precedent the House should Mr. YATES. I was making my comment 
apply to the serious issue of impeach- with respect to what the gentleman has 
ment. said in his speech. 
In conclUSion, I would like to apologize Mr. GROSS. He covered the water-
to my colleagues for the hasty research front. 
which has gone into the preparation of Mr. YATES. No, he did not. 
this argument. But for th,e sudden speed Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the 
with which tb.is immensely important gentleman yield 
issue has been placed before us, I would Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
have liked to have had the privilege of tleman from minois. 
many. more quiet hours of historical re- Mr. PUCINSKI. I wish to congratulate 
search before imposing these views on my colleague for his scholarly presenta-
the House. I will be grateful for such tion today. It brings into the subject 
corrections as my more knowledgeable some new dimensions of understanding. 
colleagues may call to my attention. I think he has performed a most not-
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the able service to the House with the exten-
gentleman yield? sive research he has done. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen- But I am troubled with some of the 
tleman. conclusions that the gentleman has 
Mr. GROSS. I thought the gentleman stated. We have a tendency to view the 
stated at the opening of his remarks that Supreme Court as an adjunct of gov-
he was not rising in defense of Justice ernment. Instead, it is a coequal branch 
William O. Douglas? of Government. coequal with the execu-
Mr. McCLOSKEY. That is correct. tive and.the legislative branches. 
Mr. GROSS. I do not think anyone- Mr. McCLOSKEY. I have noted that 
and there are Very few here-but I do we are quite free to criticize the Court, 
not think anyone who has listened to the but when we refer to ourselves, it is 
gentleman on the floor of the House could only in terms that Congress in its wisdom 
possibly construe what he has said as has done something. 
being anything but a defense of Douglas. Mr. PUCINSKI. The fact of the matter That is No. I--
Mr. McCLOSKEY. If I may respond to is that the Supreme Court, m ade up of 
that, what I have tried to do is to take nine men appointed for life, is the key-
the factual allegations against Justice stone of the R epublic. They are the ones 
Douglas and compare them with the who are charged with the responsibility 
strict constitutional criteria of either of sitting in judgment over what we in 
good behavior or criminal conduct which the legislative branch do and what the 
we would require as prosecutors, if we executive branch does. So it would seem 
were going to try to prove a case beyond that because of the peculiar position, 
a reasonable doubt. I have suggested that one , being coequal; two, being only nine 
the historical and constitutional back- men; and, three, having this awesome 
ground of impeachment requires that we, responsi~ility and authority, that their 
as the House, as prosecutors, as the gen- conduct at all. tim~s, unlike th.e conduct 
tleman from '"M:i~l11mm-suggest'eU lISt_ of the...legISla.tlYe oL.the~ecutl.ve. wQuld 
week, have that same bW'den as any be beyond reproach. 
prosecutor has-that we must satisfy An~ I find it difficult to see how tt:e 
ourselves that the evidence presents a Amencan people can find confidence m 
case beyond a reasonable doubt before and accept with no question the final 
we take it further. I contend that what- judgments of the Supreme Court on 
ever Justice Douglas may be or whoever these very important subjects that it 
he is, the facts alleged against him do not rules on, when we find one member whose 
meet that test. conduct does not beget such confidence. 
Mr. GROSS. The gentleman seems to I find it difficult to understand how we 
want to put Justice Douglas on the same can expect the American people to ac-
footing as a Member of the House, for cept these judgments without question, 
example. and there has to be some final autholity 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I would not ask of to settle the relationship in a free so-
any Justice of the Supreme Court that he ciety. 
meet the same standards of judicial ex- When we see this one member of the 
cellence and judicial behavior that the Court permitting his publisher to have 
cow·ts require themselves. This is a dif- his works reprinted in a magazine which 
ferent standard of behavior as a Member is hardcore pornography, a magazine 
of the House. that has run a scandalous cartoon of the 
Mr. GROSS. I am speaking of the con- President of the United States sitting on 
duct or answerability to the public. The a throne as King George. I am not per-
gentleman I think understands there is suaded by my colleague's explanation 
at least a slight difference between the that contracts between a publisher and 
two positions-a Justice of the U.S. Su- author give the publisher the final au-
preme Court, who is appointed for life, thority. I am sure the gentleman is right, 
removable only for cause, and a Member and I respect him as a lawyer, but again 
of the House, who can be taken out at I say that as a Supreme Court Justice-
the end of every 2 years without very and there are only nine in this country 
much difficulty by the voters. and in the world-that Supreme Court 
There are also alleged a number of as-
sociations, primarily between Albert 
Parvin and gmblers or between Parvin'~ 
attorneys and mobsters. There is the fur: 
ther allegation that Justice Douglas had 
ta h forme: ustlce Fortas in law 
schoo.l and that they remained the clos-
est fnends on and off the Supreme Court. 
In general, the associations complained 
of are between the associates of Justice 
Douglas. and third parties, not between 
the J~tlce .and such parties. 
Where is there any legal or historical 
precedent for a charge of judicial mis-
C?nduct ag,ainst a judge for having ques-
tlOnable fnends? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. That is correct and Justice must use prudence and judg-
it was precisely the desire of the f~m- ment beyond that of the average citizen 
ers of the Constitution that we set aside or average . lawyer or average author or 
our judges free from passion, prejUdice, average ~nter or a Congressman or even 
and attack by either legislative or execu- the President. 
tive branches so that they could deliber- Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr: Speaker, I am 
ate on the major issues of our time with- sure on ~ny future. occasIOn any~ne who 
out any worry about public clamor or may WrIte an article, and particularly 
popular views. Jus~i~e ~ugl~ or anyone in that high 
Mr. GROSS. A Justice of the Supreme ?OsltlOn, IS gomg to look at the fine print 
Court is not on all fours with respect m the contract between his publisher 
to the situation of a Member' is that and himself to make sure he has some 
correct? 'control over what is in the preceding and 
Boiled down to essentials, the case rests 
on, flrst, Justice Douglas' fallure to dis-
q~ifY himself in a case against a maga-
zme where he had received a $350 fee 
from a successor magazine; second, views 
stated in a book; third, excerpts from 
s~ch book being published in juxtaposi-
tionto tasteless articles or drawings by 
others; fourth, Justice Douglas' employ-
ment by a foundation of undetermJned 
but allegedly "mysterious" activities and 
fifth, .the association of Justice Do~glas: 
associates with third parties. 
In my humble Judgment, these facts 
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, will the gen- following pages where h.is article might 
tleman yield? appear.. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the .gen- I am only saymg that generally the 
tleman.from minois. author ~oes not have that right; that 
Mr. YATES. As I listened to the gen- once it 15 published, the publisher owns 
tleman's speeoh, I thought the compari- t~e property; and that the sole obliga-
son the gentleman made, between mem- tlOnhof the publisher is to pay the royalty 
bers of the Supreme Court and Members t? t e author when the article is pub-
of the Hous~ was with respect to the l1!,~e~ whe~eve~ the publisher so chooses. 
question of the payment of honorariums' ere IS eVIdence in the case brought 
namely the gentleman W1J.S referring ~ before the House last Wednesday that 
th 'tan· Mr. Justice Douglas knew this article e aooep ce by JUStice Douglas of a would be printed in juxtaposition with 
these other things, I would say that is 
in bad taste, and there is some question 
of his judgment. But we sit here as pros-
ecutors, and we are not to speculate. 
We would have to satisfy ourselves, as 
we would have ultimately to satisfy the 
Senate, that these facts are beyond 
doubt, and to speculate is beyond the dig-
nity of the Congress of the Urrlted States. 
Mr. PUCINSKI. I may be wrong, and 
time will have to prove that, but the 
gentleman tries to create the impression 
th at Justice Douglas has a right to 
participate in a dual role, one, as a 
member of the high tribunal and, two, as 
a member of society who is just another 
citizen. 
The thing that bothers me-and I 
may be wrong and time may prove me 
wrong-is I would think when one re-
flects upon the role of the Supreme Court 
and the nine Justices on that Court in 
this Republic of ours, we must also re-
flect th at everybody loses confidence, the 
people lose confidence in this tribunal. 
The Court must be outstanding and en-
joy the respect of the people, because it 
sits in final judgment. 
I would say to the gentleman I think 
Just!ce Douglas has been wrong in as-
summg the role of an ordinary citizen 
when he ought to be exercising extraordi-
nary prudence and watching every 
s~ngle thing he does because of the posi-
tiOn he holds. That is the only POint I 
make. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY . . 1 do not question 
that point, and I value the gentleman's 
contribution, and it behooves all of us as 
w~ll as the court to try to reestablish the 
faith . of the people in the Government 
and m the institutions of the United 
States, and I agree that his conduct 
should be exemplary. 
I merely point out that when we write 
an article or a book, that has never ' been 
considered in the past to constitute a 
violat ion of our duties as public officials 
and what we wanted to say outside th~ 
~onduct of our official positions on polit-
Ical matters was not considered un-
ethical or bad judgment such as to justify impeachment. 
I do not disagree with what the gentle-
man says. I merely say if we add up that 
conduct against the very stern burden of 
p roof we sh ould require before we in-
stitute the very extraordinary means of 
impeachment-which, after all, is a 
m eans of attacking the stability of" our 
institutions-we should demand a very 
strong burden of proof. 
Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Ohio. 
Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank 
the gentleman for yielding. 
It would seem to me the gentleman 
from lllinois (Mr. PuCINSKI) is making 
the argument that the conduct of the 
Supreme Court Justices should be dif-
ferent and over and above that of Mem-
bers of Congress, because of the awesome 
responsibility they seem to hold. I would 
suggest we in Congress have even greater 
responsibilities than members of the 
Supreme Court When one considers that 
we hold the power of life and death. This 
is certainly not a direct responsibility of 
the Supreme Court, although the Court 
occasionally decide on capital punish-
ment cases. 
It would seem to me that the Mem-
bers of Congress, in approving these 
last number of years military appropria-
tions which were used and expended in 
Vietnam, are certainly partially respon-
sible for the death of 40,000 youngsters 
there. 
In view of this awesome responsibility 
of Congress, perhaps the conduct of 
Members of Congress should be sub-
jected to even higher standards than 
that of the members of the Supreme 
Court. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I would agree with 
the gentleman that we are coequal 
branches of Government. 
The gentleman "from lllinois Intro-
duced the question as to how do we 
explain this to the people of the United 
States. I would suggest that there is a 
possibility the common man on the 
street, if he were asked what he was 
more concerned with, either the judi-
cial declaration of the laws of the land 
by the Supreme Court and the inter-
pretation of the laws passed by the 
Congress or, on the other hand, how 
h is taxes are to be raised or lowered and 
how the $200 billion it Is our responsi-
bility to spend are spent, he might make 
a higher demand on those of us who 
initiate his taxes and spend his money. 
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Illinois. 
Mr. YATES. Have there not been 
Members of Congress who have II.lso 
written articles published in magazines 
which others have classified as being 
pornographic? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I should like to re-
spond to the gentleman before yielding 
further. 
As I mentioned, we in the Congress 
have seen fit on numerous occa-
sions to challenge the judicial de-
terminations of the Supreme Court. 
It would seem hardly fair to deny them 
carte blanche to speak on political mat-
ters which come before our jurisdiction. 
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield further? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield. 
Mr. YATES. I want to congratulate 
the gentleman on what I consider to be 
the most important thrust of his argu-
ment, and that is that the Members of 
the House should not go off half cocked 
or emotionally on this very grave charge 
which may lead to impeachment; that 
we ought to look at the fa.ts unemotion-
ally and dispassionately in this situation. 
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Iowa. 
Mr. GROSS. What was the salary paid 
to Justice Douglas by the Parvin-Dohr-
mann Foundation? 
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. My understanding 
is it was $12,000 a yoor. I know it has 
been disclosed publicly that a U.S. Sen-
ator has received $20,000 a year plus 
travel and expenses. We raised no ques-
tion about that. 
Mr. GROSS. Of course, the gentleman 
and others seem to want to cast Justices 
of the Supreme Court on the same basis 
as Members of Congress. The public can 
get at every Senator every 6 years and at 
every Member of the House every 2 years, 
if they question his ethics or conduct. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Do I understand the 
gentleman correctly that he would im-
pose a di1Yerent standard of conduct on 
the Supreme Court? 
Mr. GROSS. Not at all. What I am say-
ing is that the public has this opportu-
nity, which they do not have in the case 
of a Justice of the Supreme Court. 
That is what the gentleman from Illi-
nois (Mr. PUCINSKI) was saying in 
another way. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. What I respond to 
that is that the constitutional framers of 
the United States intended that the peo-
ple should not have that power, that we 
were to have a third branch of the Gov-
ernment, the judiciary, set apart from 
public clamor and complaint. 
Mr. GROSS. So the gentleman believes 
it is all right for him to take $12,500 a 
year from the Parvin-Dohrmann Foun-
dation and give tax advice to them while 
he sits as a Justice of the Supreme Court? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I do not speak to 
the tax point at all. If there were an 
allegation made here, and made un-
equivocally, that he did give that tax ad-
vice, that is an entirely di1Yerent matter. 
Mr. GROSS. What about his salary? 
The gentleman agrees that a Justice of 
the Supreme Court should take a $12,500 
salary from a foundation? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I do not agree ; but 
I do not believe, if I may say this in 
response to the gentleman from Iowa 
that until this year, 1970, has the Gov~ 
ernment of the United States or the 
people of the United States come to the 
point where we say that our Congress-
men or Senators or Supreme Court Jus-
tices should not accept honoraria for 
speeches or articles they write, or that 
the Supreme Court Justices or Members 
of Congress should not serve and receive 
compensation from nonprofit founda-
tions. 
My own personal judgment is that the 
jobs we hold and the jobs the Supreme 
Court Justices hold require so much of 
our time that none of us should accept 
compensation from an,y other .source. 
But we have not yet determined that in 
our own rules for ourselves. This would 
impose an ex post facto provision on the 
Supreme Court Justice, when many 
Members of Congress receive far more 
than $12,500 a year for working outside 
their own duties, and I believe that is 
stretching it pretty far. 
Mr. GROSS. Of course, this was not 
an honorarium. It is a salary they paid. 
The $12,500 from this foundation was a 
salary, not an honorarium. 
I agree with the gentleman with re-
spect to honoraria. I certainly do. Cer-
tainly, Members of Congress should con-
duct themselves properly and be"held to 
it. However; there is a vast di1Yerence be-
tween a man who is apPOinted for life to 
serve on the Supreme Court made up of 
nine men and a man who serves in the 
House of Representatives in that respect: 
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman from lllinois. 
Mr. PUCINSKI. I wonder if my col-
league from Ohio and my colleague from 
lllinois (Mr. YATES) would address them-
se~ves to the very important distinction 
that the gentleman from Iowa makes? 
It is true that whenever a Member of 
the legislative branch of Government or 
a member of the executive branch of 
Government strays off the beaten path, 
the voters, the American people, have an 
opportunity to deal with his conduct 
every 2 years in the case of a Member 
of Congress, every 4 years in the case 
of the PreSident, and every 6 years in 
the case of a Senator. But what is the 
rule with respect to this sort of conduct 
when one has a lifetime appointment on 
the Supreme Court? Do we expect a 
different 1:ourse of conduct from the Jus-
tices than we do from the other two 
branches of Government? They say, "No, 
we do not, but· we do believe when they 
do engage in conduct that is seriously 
questionable, the legislative branch under 
the Constitution has a right to look into 
it." That is exactly what the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. CELLER), the chair-
man of the Committee on the Judiciary 
is doing at this time. ' 
However, I would like to hear my col-
leagues address themselves to the basic 
diffel'ences between the legislative branch 
service and conduct and the Supreme 
Court Justices who enjoy a lifetime .ap-
pointment. The only way you can change 
it is to enact my legislation to limit the 
term of the Supreme Court Justices to 
14 years. At that time their term will 
expire as is true with reference to the 
Federal Reserve Board and you would 
have some new blood coming onto the 
Supreme Court Bench. 
But how do you deal with a problem 
like this which is now pending before us? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. If "I may respond 
to one of those points first, I conducted 
a poll of my constituency recently and 
the result of that poll reflected that 82 
percent felt that all Justices ought to 
retire at age 70 and an even higher per-
centage of my constituency in that poll 
thought that each Congressman should 
retire at the age of 70. 
I 40 not question the fact that the 
Government of the United States might 
benefit if we had a mandatory retirement 
age. But I do say what is being forgotten 
in this discussion by the gentleman from 
lllinois, is that we have made a distinc-
tion between Supreme Court Justices and 
elected Officials, because we have delib-
erately through our colonial history and 
possibly as a result of our dealings with 
the British Crown wanted to have the 
privilege of judges sitting in independent 
judgment. We have had long .experience 
'with legislation perhaps because the 
King removed certain justices because 
they may have from time to time dis-
agreed with his policies. Therefore, we 
chose to have jUdicial iildependence so 
that those justices could deliberate with-
out the .fear that some of their conduct 
might result in the termination of the 
payment of their salary. 
I have tried to POint out the fact that 
we must balance the disrespect that we 
may feel that the Justice has brought 
upon himself against the ' need to pre-
serve an · independent judiciary because 
long after a personality may have been 
forgotten, we must have an independent 
judiciary free to deliberate on the issues 
of law which is far more desirable than 
the temporary disappointment we may 
feel against an individual whom we may 
feel has brought this upon us. 
Mr. PUC~SKI. Mr. Speaker, if the 
gentleman will yield further, this is why 
I think this dissertation by the gentle-
man is so necessary and .is deserving of 
the in-depth study which the gentleman 
has made. However, I think it proves 
what we have been saying, and that is 
that the Founding Fathers did draw a 
distinction between the executive, the 
legislative, and the Supreme Court to the 
effect that the conduct of those nine 
Justices, unlike any other American, 
must be of extraordinary prudence. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. We are in agree-
ment, but if we ask judicial restraint we 
should as Members of Congress exercise 
legislative restraint when we criticize the 
Court. We also must not bring disrespect 
upon the law and the institutions of this 
country. And, when we ask the young 
people of the land to obey the law and 
respect it, at the same time we may con-
tribute ourselves to a gr-eat disaffection 
between the public and the law and the 
Government that administers that law. 
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to 
compliment the gentleman on his pres-
entation and the legal research that he 
has so carefully undertaken. I think he 
has added a new scope and dimen-
sion to this question. In view of an earlier 
comment by the gentleman from Iowa 
(Mr. GROSS), I want to say on my own 
behalf, that I think I understand very 
clearly why the gentleman from Cali-
fornia has made his statement. I do not 
regard his remarks as being a personal 
defense of Justi~e Douglas. I believe the 
gentleman is deeply concerned, as I am 
with- the independence of the judiciary. 
I think the gentleman is saying that re-
gardless of. the personal feelings or atti-
tudes of individual Members, the ques-
tion of impeachment of a Justice is one 
that should be approached with the most 
serious caution and restraint, with the 
deepest concern for precedent and then 
only on compelling evidence of judicial 
or other misconduct justifies so grave a 
remedy. 
As I understand the gentleman, he is 
stating that allegatiOns made earlier this 
week by the distinguished minority 
leader, are not of themselves and with-
out additional evidence of misconduct 
sufficient to justify impeachment. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I thank the gen-
tleman for that stat ement. 
Mr. FOLEY. I wonder if I could ask 
the gentleman a question. 
It is my understanding that since 1813 
when tIle JUdiciary Committee of tlie 
House of Representatives was established 
as a permanent committee of this House 
there have been some 40 impeachment 
proceedings involving judges. In each of 
those save one the jurisdiction has gone 
to the Judiciary Committee ; the one ex-
ception occurring in 1839. 
Does the gentleman feel there is a 
basis now to ignore the 130-year tradi-
tion of presenting questions of impeach-
ment or investigation of impeachment to 
the Committee on the Judiciary and in-
stead of that adopting a proposal to set 
up a select committee to conduct an 
impeachment investigation? 
Mr. ·McCLOSKEY. I can only say from 
my own research and experience I do not 
believe that my experie~ce in the House 
makes me competent to mment on that. 
As much as younger Me bers would like 
to see procedures of the House changed, 
we all recognize the wisdom and the ex-
perience which has gone into the formu-
lation of the rules , so that we do not want 
to consider changing them lightly. Prece-
dent is a part of the law. It is a very 
important part. People try to predict 
what action the courts will take on the 
basis of precedent and on how they have 
acted earlier. I consider the court prece-
dents one of the great parts of the fabric 
of the law that hold the country to-
gether. We have a common understand-
ing of how the law will be implemented, 
because the courts have so construed 
these laws in the past. I would not like 
to change that precedent. And I will say 
further that my own research and expe-
rience does not include that knowledge 
that the gentleman calls for. 
Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Ohio. 
Mr . WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, I would 
like to respond briefly to the questions 
posed by the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. PUCINSKI ) relative to the con-
duct of Members of Congress vis-a-vis 
the conduct of members of the Supreme 
Court. I make four observations in this 
regard. 
First, the conduct of Members of both 
bodies should be above reproach. 
Second, I believe for that reason there 
should be no dual standard. The con-
duct of members of the Supreme Court 
should not be more above reproach than 
that of Members of the House and Sen-
a~e. As I mentioned previously, we not 
only theoretically are coequal, but in 
practical terms Members of Congress ac-
tl)ally wield more power, the power of 
life and death, than do the members of 
the Supreme Court. 
Third, I would say that if Justice 
Douglas at this time were a member of 
the court of app'eals and had been nom-
inated for membership on the Supreme 
Court, his conduct probably would lead 
to the defeat of that nomination just as 
it did in the case of Mr. Carswell, Mr. 
Haynsworth, and Mr. Fortas. 
The fourth point I would like to make 
Is simply this: that this is not a con-
firmation proceeding. For justice Doug-
las, that decision was made 31 years ago. 
Rather we are talking here about im-
peachment. 
I think that the basic question, the 
one that the gentleman (Mr. MCCLOS-
KEY) raised, is while Justice Douglas' 
conduct may be questionable, is it im-
peachable? Should it lead to impeach-
ment? And to my knowledge and my re-
search on it I have seen no evidence that 
laws have been broken. His conduct on 
occasion may have been questioned, but 
certainly I have seen no evidence in my 
research that it should lead to impeach-
ment of Justice Douglas. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I am glad the gen-
tleman has made the third and fourth 
points, because I gathered from the dia-
log last Wednesday that there were 
Members who feel that the same criteria 
should be applied as to Justices under 
consideration for appointment as to the 
impeachment of a Justice. And the 
thrust of my remarks is essentially that 
this is incorrect, because while we should 
carefully scrutinize the ability, back-
ground, and every aspect of the past be-
havior of men who are desiring to be ap-
pointed to the high office, when we are 
considering impeachment we are also 
considering legislative intrusion into ju-
dicial activity, and there our constitu-
tional backgrounds and history show the 
framers of the Constitution clearly 
wl!-nted to remove e S IDng us ces-o! 
the Supreme Court from any fear or 
consideration for their removal because 
of their political views or because of 
some dissatisfactory type of service of 
less than the ablest judge on the Bench. 
And it is the whole thrust of the remarks 
that we should not be led in the fashions 
of the moment into consideration of less 
than impeachable criteria unless deter-
mined by precedent. 
When we have had some 181 years of 
our Government, and only nine cases of 
impeaching judges, and where in all 
those instances it was either for criminal 
behavior or behavior on the Bench which 
was primarily not judicial in nature, I 
think we should go very slowly before 
bringing an impeachment proceeding 
without showing that those criteria have 
been met. 
Mr. PUCINSKI, Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman from minois. 
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I cer-
tainly would agree with my colleague 
from Ohio on all four of his points. I 
would not want the RECORD to indicate 
in any manner we are trying to set up 
a dual standard on personal conduct or 
ethics. 
But I do believe there is a basic dif-
ference between a Member of the legis-
lative branch of the Government, the 
President, a member of the executive 
branch of the Government, and the ju-
diciary. We in this Houss are divided 
through the two-party system, there is 
a majority leader and a minority leader. 
The very essence of the two-party system 
of our political institution is reflected 
every day in this House. It is also re-
flected in the philosophy that the White 
House adopts in the executive branch of 
the Government, and that shows the wis-
dom of the Founding Fathers, that the 
third coequal branch of the Government, 
the Supreme Court, is totally apolitical. 
Its only responsibility is to interpret our 
actions as they apply to the ConstittIion. 
So I say again-and I must admit with 
my colleague that I believe that impeach-
ment might be a very extraordinary ef-
fort, that we do not want to take in this 
case. I think the gentleman has done a 
good job today in putting into proper 
perspective the dilemma we find our-
selves in here, but the fact still is that 
this does not in any way mitigate the 
fact that a Supreme Court Justice, unlike 
any other citizen in this Republic, has 
to be extraordinarily careful of his con-
duct, and his prudence. If anything, I 
think tha t Justice Douglas has been im-
prudent. 
Now, there is a charge against that, 
but I am not too sure that we have a 
clear case or showing for this in trying 
to pursue the impeachment road. That 
is why I feel ' that we 1,J-ltimately ought to 
have a 14-year limitation as a constitu-
tional amendment, -or whatever it takes, 
on Supreme Court Justices, because then 
we would not have tha t question, and 
this would take care of both good Justices 
and bad Justices. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I want 
to commend the gentleman for that sug-
gestion, because I do think that in these 
years of rapidly changing technology, 
population explosion, and the tremen-
dous pressures thltt our institutions are 
under to respond to the tremendous new 
problems that were not the case earlier, 
we do benefit by a more rapid turnover 
of our executive and of our legislative 
branches. 
I , myself, lean toward the position of 
retirement at age 70, rather than a fixed 
term of years for Supreme Court 
Justices. 
I hope that this dialog will be carried 
on and that further consideration will 
be given in the 91st Congress to this 
subject. 
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gen-
tleman. 
Mr. GROSS. Does the gentleman know 
whether Justice Douglas signed his wide-
open contract with the book publisher 
after the article appeared in Avant 
Garde or whatever the name of the 
publication? 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I have no idea of 
the facts of that matter other than as 
was set forth in the RECORD last Wednes-
day by the distinguished minority leader 
-.lill.d the Eentleman from New Ham'ps"",hTi",re",==",,.-~-{ (Mr. YMANJ. I ave no Ide of 
facts at all in this case and I make 
no defense of the Justice and I attack 
him not. 
But I do think, looking at the facts in 
the RECORD, that they would not be 
sufficient to justify impeachment and 
that is one of the questions that should 
be understood before impeachment were 
to be considered. 
Mr. GROSS. If the gentleman will 
indulge me in one quick observation, I 
think that the .j"ustices of the Sl,lpreme 
Court have all that they can do to take 
care of the business of the Supreme 
Court without going outside to serve as 
tax advisers on cases that may come 
before them for solution at a later time. 
I can recall one writ that has been 
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court 
since January of 1966 and it has not yet 
been disposed of-and that is 4 years 
ago. 
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I fully agree with 
the gentleman. I think of all the re-
marks I have heard the distinguished 
gentleman from Iowa make, his com-
ments last week, when he was advised 
of the legislative schedule for this week, 
on what we ought to do, to give con-
sideration to turning back some of our 
pay, is the most impressive that I have 
heard . I think we should impose on the 
Supreme Court and all the Justices of 
the U.S. district courts and appellate 
courts a full working day and more rapid 
handling of cases before them. 
I hesitate, however, to criticize the 
Court when I feel that we here in the 
Congress are the ones considering the 
issue of impeachment, and this is our 
obligation, to impose legislative restraint 
and caution on ourselves. 
